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How does foreign language influence consumer dishonesty? We propose a self-
diagnosticity theory arguing that compared to one’s native language, using a for-
eign language makes lying appear less self-diagnostic, thereby increasing or de-
creasing lying depending on which aspect of the self is salient. In situations where
lying reflects an undesirable, dishonest self, using a foreign language increases ly-
ing. In contrast, in situations where lying primarily reflects a desirable (e.g., com-
petent or compassionate) self, using a foreign language decreases lying. Ten
studies, spanning various languages, consumer contexts, and experimental para-
digms, support the theory. The studies establish that the effect of language on ly-
ing jointly depends on the self-diagnosticity of lying and on whether lying is diag-
nostic of a positive or a negative aspect of the self. The findings highlight self-
diagnosticity as a valuable lens to understand the behavior of bilingual consumers
and offer practical guidance for addressing dishonesty in the marketplace.
Keywords: language, self-signaling, dishonesty, unethical decision-making, self-
diagnosticity
Consumers lie and cheat, in contexts as diverse as in-surance claims, product returns, dating profiles, and
tax declarations. When signing up for online services, for
example, they often lie about their birthday to be eligible
for discounts (Johnson 2015). Consumer dishonesty produ-
ces substantial costs: automobile insurance fraud costs US
companies more than $5 billion annually and prompts sig-
nificantly higher premiums for all drivers (Insurance
Research Council 2012). Although most consumers lie in
their native language (hereafter, L1), they can also lie in
their second language (L2): travelers misreport information
when they fill out lost-luggage forms; immigrants fail to
disclose medical conditions to health insurers; overseas
consumers claim discounts by faking their online identi-
ties; and foreign customers post inaccurate reviews in
English to attract a wider audience. Most people in the
world speak more than one language, and the number of
multilingual people is increasing (Grosjean 2010), so it is
important for consumer researchers to understand how lan-
guage shapes lying behavior.
In this paper, we develop a theory to predict when L2
increases or decreases lying. Our self-diagnosticity theory
of how language influences dishonesty connects three
prominent streams of research: on self-diagnosticity
(Bodner and Prelec 2003; Toure-TIllery and Kouchaki
2020; Toure-Tillery and Light 2018), on bilingualism
(Hayakawa et al. 2016; Luna and Peracchio 2005; Zhang
and Schmitt 2004), and on dishonesty (Argo, White, and
Dahl 2006; Cowley and Anthony 2019; Nikolova,
Lamberton, and Coleman 2018). The theory’s main
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proposition is that relative to L1, L2, increases lying by
making actions in L2 appear less diagnostic of dishonesty.
Critically, the same mechanism can reverse the effect of
language when lying is diagnostic of a desirable aspect of
the self. As such, our theory provides a way to resolve in-
consistent predictions and findings in recent psychological
research (Alempaki, Dogan, and Yang 2020; Bereby-
Meyer et al. 2020; Suchotzki and Gamer 2018). By study-
ing dishonesty, we also provide novel insights into phe-
nomena that are of great relevance to managers and policy
makers. Lying occurs in countless occasions, for myriad
reasons. In this research, we primarily focus on selfish ly-
ing that is motivated by a desire to gain (or avoid losing)
resources such as money or time. Selfish lying is especially
relevant to business and society, given its costs to organiza-
tions, governments, and honest consumers. In addition, we
examine prosocial lying that frequently occurs between
consumers, with the purpose of providing a more complete
picture of how language influences dishonesty.
Next, we review research on lying and bilingualism and
develop a theory of the role of language in dishonesty. We
then present the results of ten studies. The studies span sev-
eral languages and consumer contexts, establishing the ef-
fect of language on both real and imagined behaviors. We
conclude with theoretical implications and future research
directions.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Past Research on Lying and Bilingualism
Consumer research has examined both consumer lying
and bilingualism extensively but separately. Researchers
have investigated how much people lie (Mazar, Amir, and
Ariely 2008), the content of lies (e.g., emotions) (Andrade
and Ho 2009; Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002), the motiva-
tion to lie (e.g., social comparison) (Argo et al. 2006;
Goldsmith, Roux, and Ma 2018; Mazar and Zhong 2010),
consequences of lying (Anthony and Cowley 2012;
Cowley and Anthony 2019), and moral judgment of lies
(Argo and Shiv 2012). They also have investigated specific
dishonest consumer behaviors, such as purchases of coun-
terfeit products (Wang, Stoner, and John 2019; Wilcox,
Kim, and Sen 2009), lying in consumer surveys (de Jong,
Fox, and Steenkamp 2015), the influence of social bonds
on lying (Nikolova et al. 2018), and lying to harmful
brands (Rotman, Khamitov, and Connors 2018).
Similarly, a great deal of research has been devoted to
understanding the role of language in consumer behavior
(Carnevale, Luna, and Lerman 2017). Language (L2 vs.
L1) influences advertising effectiveness (Krishna and
Ahluwalia 2008; Luna and Peracchio 2001, 2005; Puntoni,
de Langhe, and van Osselaer 2009) and brand evaluations
(Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube 1994; Shrum et al. 2012;
Zhang and Schmitt 2004); L2 use can polarize scale ratings
(de Langhe et al. 2011) and reduce impulsive decision-
making (Klesse, Levav, and Goukens 2015). To our knowl-
edge, no previous consumer research has examined how
language relates to lying behaviors, though researchers in
other fields have.
Prior research linking bilingualism and lying can be di-
vided into three categories. One line of research focuses on
the detection of lying and demonstrates that L2 speakers
are more likely to be judged as lying, even when they are
not (Elliott and Leach 2016; Evans and Michael 2014).
Another stream of research, more relevant here, examines
the cognitive processing of lies (Caldwell-Harris and
Ayçiçegi-Dinn 2009; Du~nabeitia and Costa 2015;
Suchotzki and Gamer 2018). In these studies, bilinguals
generated true and false statements in L1 or L2, and
markers of the psychological process, such as skin conduc-
tance and response latencies, were recorded. These studies
show that using L2, whether for true or false statements, is
more cognitively demanding than using L1. However, lies
in L2 feel milder to people (Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçegi-
Dinn 2009, Experiment 2), which counteracts the difficulty
of using a foreign language for lying (Du~nabeitia and
Costa 2015; Suchotzki and Gamer 2018). This is consistent
with the robust finding that people are less resistant to the
idea of murder (e.g., kill one to save five) when reading
moral dilemmas in L2 (Corey et al. 2017; Hayakawa et al.
2017).
Based on these findings, one may expect L2 to increase
lying relative to L1. This prediction, nonetheless, contra-
dicts the third line of research on language and incentivized
lying behavior. In one set of studies, participants had the
opportunity to lie in a paired game (Alempaki et al. 2020).
Participants first earned points by solving matrices within a
time limit and were then matched with another player, to
whom they sent an anonymous message about their perfor-
mance difference. Participants could earn more money by
overreporting the performance gap in favor of themselves.
Playing the game in English (L2) reduced lying in native
Chinese speakers but not in native German speakers. The
authors propose that this inconsistency is best explained by
cultural accommodation, such that people adjusted their
honesty level according to the perceived cultural gap be-
tween L1 and L2. Yet, causal evidence for this speculation
is lacking. In another set of studies, participants were asked
to roll a six-sided die three times and report their first roll
by selecting a number from one to six (Bereby-Meyer et al.
2020). The higher the reported number, the larger the re-
ward. Participants’ reports were compared against the
chance-level distribution of outcomes. Greater deviation
from chance indicates more lying. Different from the find-
ings by Alempaki et al. (2020), administering the paradigm
in L2 reduced lying across language pairs. However, the
psychological underpinning of these findings remains
unclear.
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We suggest that part of the difficulty to derive theoreti-
cal insights from these behavioral studies stems from the
paradigms used for lie detection. In the performance differ-
ence reporting (Alempaki et al. 2020), participants were
not only incentivized to lie, but motivated to outperform
their counterparts. Indeed, recent research shows that the
motive to appear competent in an ability test undermines
the motive to behave morally (Falk and Szech 2020).
Therefore, it is unclear whether the paradigm documents
the motive to lie for material benefits, the motive to outper-
form others, or both. What further complicates the interpre-
tation of the studies is the decisions participants had to
make. They had to first decide whether to lie and then how
far to stretch the truth (i.e., how much to earn). The second
decision is inherently more difficult, as there are a number
of lies to choose from, which could deter people from ly-
ing. Thus, the paradigm conflates the propensity to lie with
the sensitivity to choice overload. The same issue arises
with the roll-a-die paradigm. Moreover, since the roll-a-die
paradigm requires participants to recall the first die roll out
of three, it may not capture intentional lying but memory
errors (i.e., misattributing the desirable outcome to the first
round).
In sum, the extant literature provides inconsistent predic-
tions and findings about the effect of language on lying be-
havior. Adding to that, it is unclear how the results from
previous studies should be interpreted and whether these
results would apply to consumers who lie about personal or
product information (vs. task performance or random
events), not to mention those who lie for others’ benefits
(i.e., prosocial lying).
A Self-Diagnosticity Theory of Language and
Lying
Self-Diagnosticity and Its Malleability. There is over-
whelming evidence that people are inclined to tell the truth,
even when the payoff of lying is substantial and the risk of
being caught is nonexistent (for a meta-analytic review,
see Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond 2019). This suggests
that lying is intrinsically costly to consumers, that is, lying
betrays a valued part of one’s identity. Indeed, being hon-
est, and being moral in general, is deemed of the utmost
importance to one’s identity (Strohminger and Nichols
2014). Lying for undeserved benefits, therefore, constitutes
a fundamental threat to one’s self-concept. Nevertheless,
lying is not uncommon. Mazar et al. (2008) explain this
contradiction by proposing a theory of self-concept mainte-
nance, according to which people lie when doing so is easy
to justify. The reason is that justifications help people flex-
ibly categorize lying behavior as not immoral. Similarly,
Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel (2018) propose that the in-
trinsic cost of lying, or the extent lying is perceived as
against the goal to be an honest person, is determined by
situational factors, such as the distance between the truth
and the lie, and that people lie when the intrinsic cost of ly-
ing falls below a threshold.
A common premise underlying these theories is that the
extent to which people view lying as diagnostic of
dishonesty is context specific. The malleability of the self-
diagnosticity of one’s choice has been corroborated by
empirical research in marketing, economics, and psychol-
ogy (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012; Gneezy et al. 2012;
Toure-Tillery and Fishbach 2012, 2015). In the realm of
dishonesty research, one study incentivized students to lie
about coin flips by assigning them to an easy or a difficult
task based on each flip outcome (Toure-Tillery and
Fishbach 2012, study 1). Students tended to avoid lying in
more salient, self-diagnostic parts of the study—the begin-
ning and the end (also see Toure-Tillery and Fishbach
2015)—but to lie in the middle to save time and effort.
Hence, people avoid lying in contexts where lying is per-
ceived as diagnostic of dishonesty.
Extending these lines of research, we suggest that lying
behavior is not simply determined by the diagnosticity of
the dishonest self, but in general by the diagnosticity of the
self-concept that is situationally salient. Following prior re-
search, we conceptualize the self-concept as a cluster of
characteristics that people believe define who they are
(Reed et al. 2012). The consensus in past research is that
the self-concept is multi-dimensional and that which aspect
is most self-defining can vary across situations (Markus
and Wurf 1987). For instance, as we will discuss later,
while selfish lying is deterred by the diagnosticity of the
dishonest self, prosocial lying is encouraged by the diag-
nosticity of the compassionate self, another core trait of
moral identity.
L2 Reduces Self-Diagnosticity. We contend that lan-
guage influences lying behavior by changing its perceived
self-diagnosticity. Specifically, compared to L1, L2
furnishes a context in which lying appears less self-
diagnostic. This proposition is based on the notion that lan-
guage is a probe for personal memories (Puntoni et al.
2009). Because L1 is the language in which most experien-
ces and knowledge are encoded, it uniquely serves as a cue
for self-related memories and values, strengthening the ac-
cessibility of the self-concept and its subsumed self-
categorizations. Supporting this notion, research shows
that cognitive associations between “self” and other con-
cepts are more readily established in L1 than in L2 (Ivaz,
Costa, and Du~nabeitia 2016). In contrast, L2 is mostly
learned for instrumental purposes and less likely to remind
people of formative experiences for one’s self-concept,
such as parent–child interactions (Reese, Bird, and Tripp
2007). As a result, L2 should make core self-aspects less
accessible compared to L1. In line with this, qualitative re-
search shows that people tend to describe their thoughts
and feelings in L2 from a dramaturgical perspective
(Goffman 1959), as if acting a persona that is detached
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from their real self (Pavlenko 2006). For these reasons, we
propose that people tend to see their actions as less diag-
nostic of who they are in L2 than in L1 contexts. By de-
creasing self-diagnosticity, L2 should reduce the intrinsic
costs of lying (betraying a valued part of self), as well as
its intrinsic benefits (affirming a core self) of lying. In turn,
this reduced self-diagnosticity should increase the occur-
rence of lying when it is diagnostic of an undesirable self
but decrease lying when it is diagnostic of a desirable self.
We elaborate on this general prediction and detail our hy-
potheses in what follows.
When L2 Increases Lying. Based on the reasoning
above, we predict that L2 (vs. L1) would increase selfish
lying by decreasing the perceived diagnosticity of the dis-
honest self. This prediction is consistent with the finding
that selfish lying is relatively rare (Abeler et al. 2019) and
that people tend to view honesty as the most important
moral trait (Aquino and Reed 2002; we present in appendix
a replication of their results conducted outside of the North
American context). However, when lying is only weakly
diagnostic of the dishonest self, the intrinsic cost of lying
should be minimal and there should be little room for L2 to
further reduce self-diagnosticity and to increase lying.
Hence, we predict that contextual cues that reduce the
diagnosticity of the dishonest self (e.g., when the lie is
close to the truth and when the lie reflects a common state
of the world; Gneezy et al. 2018) should make lying in L1
rise to a level similar to L2.
Another prediction from our theory is that lying in L2
would decrease to a level similar to L1 when situational
cues make lying in L2 more diagnostic of the dishonest
self. Prior research shows that strengthening the link be-
tween the self and overt behavior reduces lying in L1
(Bryan, Adams, and Monin 2013). We expect a similar ef-
fect in L2, which should reduce lying in L2 and reduce the
language effect.
When L2 Decreases Lying. Our theorizing also sug-
gests that L2 can decrease lying when lying primarily
reflects a desirable aspect of the self, instead of an undesir-
able, dishonest self. If behavior is seen as generally less
self-diagnostic in L2, that should also be the case for other
dimensions of the self that are relevant to a given situation.
As a result, L2 should reduce lying that primarily implies a
positive self.
We consider two cases where lying can have positive
self-implications. First, in situations where people have the
opportunity to lie in the pursuit of a performance goal, self-
ish lying, by claiming goal achievement, can be diagnostic
of the competent self. Consistent with this line of reason-
ing, activating bankers’ professional identity increases
their lying for financial gains presumably because financial
performance is highly valued by their professional self and
this identity temporally overrides their moral self (Cohn,
Fehr, and Marechal 2014). In the same vein, we predict
that activating a performance goal that competes with the
moral self can reverse the effect of language on selfish ly-
ing. Specifically, when lying is diagnostic of competence
but only weakly of dishonesty, lying becomes intrinsically
rewarding and the reward should be larger in L1 than in
L2, resulting in less lying in L2 than in L1.
Second, lying is considered moral when it is motivated
by prosocial considerations, such as protecting others’ feel-
ings or saving others’ time and effort (Argo et al. 2011).
Research shows that prosocial lying, such as providing
overly positive feedback, is driven by compassion toward
others (Lupoli, Jampol, and Oveis 2017). This suggests
that prosocial lying should be perceived as weakly diag-
nostic of dishonesty but as highly of compassion, another
key component of moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002).
According to our theorizing, L2 should therefore reduce
prosocial lying, and the magnitude of the language effect
depends on the extent to which prosocial lying is viewed as
diagnostic of the compassionate self.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
Table 1 summarizes the nine studies (plus a pilot study)
that test our theory. The studies span a variety of consumer
settings (time saving, identity-faking, recommendation, in-
surance, compensation, performance-based rewards, res-
taurant choice), lies (about random events, private
information, possessions, product features, performance,
and food preferences), and languages (including Chinese,
Dutch, English, French, and Korean). To avoid language
bias in subjective ratings (de Langhe et al. 2011), we did
not inquire people about their intention to lie but elicited
real behavior or scenario-based choices.
The pilot study examines our assumption that people see
their actions as more self-diagnostic in L1 versus L2 lan-
guage contexts. Studies 1 and 2 establish the main effect
that L2 increases selfish lying. Moreover, study 2 tests our
prediction that cueing self-diagnosticity in L2 attenuates
the effect. Studies 3 to 5 test the boundary condition that
lying in L1 rises to a level similar to L2 when lying
becomes less diagnostic of the dishonest self. Studies 6a,
6b, and 6c demonstrate that, when the competence motive
overrides the morality motive, the effect of language can
reverse. Lastly, study 7 shows that L2 decreases prosocial
lying that reflects compassion more than dishonesty and
that the magnitude of this language effect depends on how
diagnostic of the compassionate self an individual believes
prosocial lying to be.
In all studies, there is no risk for participants of being
caught lying and the incentive for lying is kept constant be-
tween language conditions. Every study includes steps to
ensure that participants comprehended the study materials
in both L1 and L2. We report results with and without data
exclusions in all studies. Web appendix A details how
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sample sizes were pre-determined. See web appendices E
and F for the key measurements in English.
PILOT STUDY: LANGUAGE AND SELF-
DIAGNOSTICITY
This pilot study tests the key premise of our theory that
L2 reduces self-diagnosticity. To do so, we examine
whether people see their actions in L1 contexts as generally
more self-diagnostic than their actions in L2 contexts.
Method
To generalize the results across language pairs, we
recruited 501 native Chinese speakers who use English as
L2 (from Credamo.com, a Chinese survey platform; 232
females, Mage ¼ 27.54, SDage ¼ 5.70), 127 native English
speakers who speak a second language (from Prolific; 44
females, Mage ¼ 29.92, SDage ¼ 10.53), and 518 native
speakers of other languages who speak English as L2
(from Prolific; 198 females, Mage ¼ 29.69, SDage ¼ 0.49).
Participants rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (absolutely in
L1) to 7 (absolutely in L2) the extent to which they see
their actions in L1 versus L2 contexts as more indicative of
who they are. A lower value on the scale means that people
see their actions in L1 as more self-diagnostic than their
actions in L2. For non-native English speakers, L1 is la-
beled as their native language and L2 is English. For native
English speakers, L1 is English and L2 is the foreign lan-
guage they are most fluent in.
Results and Discussion
To examine whether people believe their actions in L1
as more self-diagnostic, we compared the ratings against
the scale midpoint (4), which indicates that actions in L1
and L2 are equally self-diagnostic, with one-sample t-test.
Overall, we find that people see their actions in L1 contexts
are more indicative of who they are than their actions in L2
contexts (M¼ 3.01, SD ¼ 1.63, t(1,145) ¼ 20.62, p <
.001, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.61). The effect holds for native
Chinese speakers from Credamo (M¼ 3.04, SD ¼ 1.701
t(500) ¼ 12.54, p < .001, d ¼ 0.56), native English
speakers from Prolific (M¼ 2.49, SD ¼ 1.56, t(126) ¼
10.90, p < .001, d ¼ 0.97), and native speakers of other
languages from Prolific (M¼ 3.10, SD ¼ 1.55, t(517) ¼
13.25, p < .001, d ¼ 0.58). These findings corroborate
the assumption that L2 reduces self-diagnosticity.
STUDY 1: LYING TO SAVE TIME
Study 1 tests the effect of language on selfish lying using
a widely-used coin-toss paradigm. Similar to the roll-a-die
task (Bereby-Meyer et al. 2020), it allows people to lie
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However, it does not require remembering the event and
simplifies the choice people have to make. Previous re-
search shows that people prefer telling the truth in the
coin-toss task (Abeler, Becker, and Falk 2014), suggesting
that in this task lying is diagnostic of dishonesty and thus
appropriate for testing our hypothesis.
Method
Two hundred and fifteen business-major undergraduates
(103 females; Mage ¼ 21, SDage ¼ 1.7) participated in a 30
minute lab session for course credits. Participants were na-
tive Dutch speakers who used English as a second lan-
guage. The session included multiple, unrelated studies.
Participants were seated in private cubicles and completed
the studies on a computer.
Our study ostensibly served as a break between studies,
administered either in Dutch (L1) or in English (L2). We
note that the alternation between L1 and L2 was natural to
our participants who were enrolled in either a bilingual or
English-language program and are very fluent in English
(the other studies in the lab session were all in English).
This means that students in the L2 condition were unlikely
to find language barrier as an excuse for lying.
In the study, we asked participants to flip a coin to deter-
mine whether they would enter a short version (2 minutes)
or a long version (10 minutes) of the next study. Critically,
we told them that getting the short version meant that they
could leave the lab earlier. To complete the task, partici-
pants were told to use either their own coin or a spare coin
under a cup placed next to the computer. After the flip, par-
ticipants selected the short (head) or the long (tail) study
on the screen. In reality, all participants completed the
same subsequent studies.
Results and Discussion
In the absence of incentives to lie, the distribution of
heads and tails should be roughly equal (50%). However,
the time-saving incentive should motivate people to report
heads. Indeed, 65% of participants in the L1 condition (70
out of 107) reported head in the coin toss. Supporting our
prediction, an even larger proportion did so in the L2 con-
dition (86 out of 108, or 80%) and the increase was signifi-
cant (v2(1) ¼ 5.45, p ¼ .020, d¼ 0.40).
Contrary to the findings of previous research, in this
study, L2 increased lying behavior. This is especially strik-
ing given that, similar to a paradigm used in prior research
(Bereby-Meyer et al. 2020), we allowed participants to lie
about a random event in the lab but eliminated the potential
for memory error and choice overload. This suggests that
the findings in prior research are at least partially attribut-
able to the paradigms used, as discussed earlier.
STUDY 2: FAKING IDENTITY
Study 2 tests whether dishonesty can be curbed in L2
when situational cues make lying be perceived as more
self-diagnostic in L2. As in study 1, we expected that L2
would increase lying relative to L1 in the absence of addi-
tional cues for self-diagnosticity. However, this effect
should be weaker when one’s decision is labeled as self-
diagnostic.
Study 2 adds to study 1 in two additional ways. A limita-
tion of study 1 is that in the coin-toss paradigm dishonesty
cannot be detected at the individual level. In study 2, we
therefore designed a controlled scenario that taps into a
consumer-relevant setting: faking identity. With study 2,
we also aim to generalize the language effect to lying to
save money, instead of time.
Method
We aimed for 300 native Chinese participants from
Credamo.com, a Chinese survey company and 413
attempted our study. They were asked to imagine that they
were traveling in an English-speaking country and planned
to visit several local museums. They could purchase a mu-
seum card that would allow them to enter almost any mu-
seum in that country and the card would cost them about
500 CNY. A Chinese friend, living in that country, told
them that they could use her museum card because the lo-
cal museums never inspect cardholders. After reading the
scenario, people indicated whether they would be caught if
they use the friend’s card. Among the 413 respondents,
113 who gave the wrong answer “yes” (i.e., non-
participants) were directed to the end of the study. The
remaining 300 proceeded (163 females; Mage ¼ 28.05,
SDage ¼ 4.98). We note that this question guaranteed that
the perceived risk of being caught was zero for all
participants.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three
conditions: L1, L2 (English), and self-salient L2. They
were shown the friend’s museum card and asked to indi-
cate whether they would use the friend’s card or buy their
own (binary choice). The dishonesty measure was adminis-
tered either in L1 or L2. In the self-salient L2 condition,
we also told participants the following: “We would test
whether you are a moral person. The test has been vali-
dated across populations. It accurately predicts how honest
a person is in real life, such as how likely the person is go-
ing to cheat on others, to evade tickets, etc.” Afterwards,
all participants were asked to translate the focal question
from L2 to L1. Most participants translated it correctly
(96% in L1 condition, 99% in L2 condition, and 95% in
the self-salient L2 condition). The study ended with demo-
graphic questions.
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Results and Discussion
A Chi-square analysis showed a significant difference in
the proportion of liars across conditions (v2(2) ¼ 13.21, p
¼ .001). The results are summarized in figure 1. Consistent
with study 1, there was a higher proportion of liars in L2
(69 out of 96, or 72%) than in L1 (56 out of 99, or 57%),
v2(1) ¼ 4.96, p ¼ .026, d¼ 0.37. Moreover, making the
dishonest self-salient before L2 usage lowered the propor-
tion of liars (49 out of 105, or 47%, v2(1) ¼ 13.15, p <
.001, d ¼ 0.53 compared to the L2 condition) and elimi-
nated the language effect (v2(1) ¼ 2.00, p ¼ .157, d ¼
0.20 compared to the L1 condition). Excluding cases
with incorrect translations of the focal question generated
the same pattern of results (v2(2) ¼ 13.38, p ¼ .001; 73%,
57%, and 47% liars in L2, L1, and self-salient L2 condi-
tions, respectively).
Consistent with study 1, study 2 shows that L2 makes
people more willing to lie to save money. Supporting the
theory, cueing people to think of the choice in L2 as
self-diagnostic reduced lying in L2 to a similar level as
in L1. Moreover, underscoring the magnitude of the lan-
guage effect, a relatively subtle alteration to the stimuli
as changing the language of the dependent variable pro-




Study 3 tests another proposed boundary condition: that
reducing the self-diagnosticity of lying would shrink the
effect of language, in the context of product recommenda-
tion. Following prior research, we manipulate self-
diagnosticity by varying the magnitude of the difference
between the truthful answer and the answer that brings ma-
terial rewards, that is, the truth-lie gap. Research has estab-
lished that a larger truth-lie gap makes lying more
diagnostic of the dishonest self (Gneezy et al. 2018; Hilbig
and Hessler 2013). For example, Mazar et al.’s (2008) self-
concept maintenance model posits that a larger truth-lie
gap makes it harder to justify a lie, and hence harder to rec-
oncile it with the desire to see oneself as honest.
Method
Design and Participants. We aimed for 900 native
Chinese speakers from the registered users of Baidu.com,
the largest search engine in China, and received 910
responses in total (427 females, Mage ¼ 30.6, SDage ¼ 7.2).
The study used a 2 (L2 vs. L1) by 2 (truth-lie gap: large vs.
small) between-participants design.
Procedure. The first part of the study was administered
in L1. Participants completed a series of demographic
questions. Then, we asked them to imagine that they could
recommend products anonymously on an overseas shop-
ping website. The website invited them to recommend a
pair of bluetooth earphones to other customers, based on
its battery life. They could recommend either brand A or
brand B. If they recommended brand B, they would receive
100 CNY as reward. If they recommend brand A, they
would receive no reward. To check whether participants
understood the materials, we asked them to select the basis
for recommendation (“battery life” or “sound quality”) and
which brand gave the 100 CNY reward. A non-trivial pro-
portion of participants failed one of the checks (33% in the
L1 condition and 33% in the L2 condition, 299 participants
in total). To avoid the results being affected by this, we ex-
cluded these participants from later analyses. We note that
the understanding checks were administered in L1 and peo-
ple’s performance did not differ by condition, suggesting
that there was no systematic bias in understanding between
L1 and L2 conditions. The elaboration of the scenario in
L1 and the understanding checks also ensured that partici-
pants could hardly use language barrier in L2 as an excuse
for lying.
Participants then proceeded to the second part of the
study, which was administered either in L1 or in L2. They
viewed a pair of earphones, one of brand A and one of
brand B, with the product of brand B having a shorter bat-
tery life. We manipulated the diagnosticity of the dishonest
self by making the battery life of brand B either very far
(large truth-lie gap condition) or very close (small truth-lie
gap condition) to that of brand A. In the large truth-lie gap
condition, the battery life of brand A was 9 hours, whereas
that of brand B only 3 hours. In the small truth-lie gap con-
dition, the battery life of brand A was 9 hours and that of
brand B 8.5 hours. We asked participants to select which
brand of earphones they would recommend.
FIGURE 1
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Pretest. To validate the self-diagnosticity manipula-
tion, we conducted a pretest with another sample of 100
native Chinese speakers (53 females, Mage ¼ 30, SDage ¼
5.5). They were randomly assigned to view the pair of ear-
phones in the large or small truth-lie gap condition and
rated how honest would it be if they recommend (the infe-
rior) brand B on a 7-point scale (“How honest would it be
if you recommend brand B?” 1¼ very dishonest to
7¼ very honest). A t-test confirms that the lie is less diag-
nostic of the dishonest self when the battery life of brand B
is 8.5 hours (small truth-lie gap; M¼ 3.93, SD ¼ 1.98) in-
stead of 3 hours (large truth-lie gap; M¼ 3.42, SD ¼ 1.85),
t(98) ¼ 3.42, p < .001, d¼ 0.69.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a logistic regression with the decision to
lie as the outcome variable (recommend brand B¼ 1, rec-
ommend brand A¼ 0). Language (L2 vs. L1), truth-lie gap
(large vs. small), and their interaction served as predictors.
The interaction was significant (b ¼ 1.20, SE ¼ 0.35, z
¼ 3.48, p < .001, Cohen’s d¼ 0.661). The results are
presented in figure 2. Confirming the proposed moderation
by self-diagnosticity, L2 increased lying when the truth-lie
gap was large (54% in L2 vs. 27% in L1, b¼ 1.16, SE ¼
0.24, z¼ 4.76, p < .001, d¼ 0.46), but not when it was
small (59% in L2 vs. 60% in L1, b ¼ 0.04, SE ¼ 0.24, z
¼ 0.17, p ¼ .863, d ¼ 0.02). The interaction persisted
when we included all participants in the analyses (interac-
tion: b ¼ 0.77, SE ¼ 0.28, z ¼ 2.79, p ¼ .005, d ¼
0.42). Study 3 thus replicates our finding that L2
increases selfish lying and supports the boundary condition
derived from our theory: the language effect decreased
when the decision to lie was less diagnostic of the dishon-
est self.
STUDY 4: CAR INSURANCE
An alternative explanation for the findings of studies 1–
3 is that self-diagnosticity is not undermined by L2 but by
the cultural meaning associated with it (Hong et al. 2000).
Studies 1–3 used English as L2 and prior research shows
that English is associated with the rule of law and
Calvinistic values (Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz
2007). This suggests that culture-priming is an unlikely ex-
planation for our findings. However, to empirically rule
out this possibility, in study 4, we tested the same English-
language scenario on native and non-native English speak-
ers. According to the culture-priming account, L1 and L2
speakers should exhibit similar behavioral patterns (be-
cause the stimuli are expressed in the same language for all
participants) and self-diagnosticity should no longer
moderate the language effect. In contrast, our theorizing
posits that non-native speakers should exhibit more dishon-
esty than native speakers when the choice is diagnostic of
the dishonest self.
Another possible explanation for L2 increasing selfish
lying relates to code switching. Accordingly, the switch
from L1 to L2 (studies 2 and 3, where participants in the
L2 condition switched from Chinese to English) reduces
self-awareness and increases lying, while the switch from
L2 to L1 (study 1, where participants in the L1 condition
switched from English to Dutch) increases self-awareness
and decreases lying. To rule out this possibility, study 4
features no code switching. Moreover, the study adds to
the previous ones by focusing on another common type of
consumer dishonesty: insurance fraud.
Method
We recruited 210 native English speakers and 211 non-
native English speakers from Prolific, totaling 421 partici-
pants (224 females, Mage¼ 33.1, SDage ¼ 10.8). The non-
native English speakers have diverse language back-
grounds. As in study 3, the study adopted a 2 (non-native
speakers as the L2 group vs. native speaker as the
L1group) by 2 (truth-lie gap: large vs. small) between-
participants design. Because Prolific prescreened partici-
pants by their native language ex ante and the entire study
was administered in English, study 4 gives no clue to par-
ticipants that it is about language.
Participants first completed a series of demographic
questions and then read a car insurance scenario adapted
from Schweitzer and Hsee (2002). Specifically, they were
asked to imagine they acquired a second-hand car about a
month earlier. They intended to purchase insurance for the
FIGURE 2
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car and had to report the odometer mileage to the insurance
company. Importantly, they had to pay 500 UK pounds
more (as Prolific is a British platform) if the mileage
exceeded 5,000 miles.
In the large truth-lie gap condition, we told participants
that the odometer mileage was 6,000 miles when they ac-
quired the car. After a month of driving, the mileage now
was 6,500 miles (i.e., 1,500 miles more than the threshold).
In the small truth-lie gap condition condition, we told par-
ticipants that the odometer mileage was 4,600 miles when
they acquired the car. After a month of driving, the mileage
now was 5,100 miles (i.e., only exceeding the threshold by
100 miles). We told participants that there was no way for
the insurance company to find out the actual mileage and
asked them to indicate how many miles they would claim
to the insurance company, in an open-ended format. A pre-
test with another 200 participants validated that lying (i.e.,
claiming 5,000 miles or lower) is more diagnostic of the
dishonest self when the truth-lie gap is large as opposed to
small (see web appendix B for the pretest results and a rep-
lication of study 4).
We ended the study with a comprehension check, by
asking participants to indicate when they had to pay a
higher premium according to the scenario, by selecting
“when you report above 5,000 miles” or “when you report
5,000 miles or below.” Most people in the L1 group (99%)
and the L2 group (98%) answered correctly, so we do not
exclude any participant from analyses.
Results and Discussion
We coded any claim below or equal to 5,000 miles as ly-
ing and otherwise honest. A logistic regression revealed a
significant interaction between language and self-
diagnosticity (b ¼ 0.93, SE ¼ 0.42, z ¼ 2.19, p ¼ .029,
d¼ 0.51). Figure 3 shows the results. Replicating the find-
ings of study 3, L2 increased lying when the truth-lie gap
is large (45% in L2 vs. 26% in L1, b¼ 0.85, SE ¼ 0.30,
z¼ 2.86, p ¼ .004, d¼ 0.47) but not when it is small (70%
in L2 vs. 71% in L1, p ¼ .797, d ¼ 0.03). Thus, study 4
replicates the pattern in study 3 with an insurance-fraud
scenario. By distributing the same study to both native and
non-native speakers, we ruled out cultural priming and
code-switching as alternative explanations.
STUDY 5: LYING ABOUT AGE
The goal of study 5 is to replicate the findings in studies
3 and 4 with real behavior and an individual-level measure
of truth-lie gap. We provided participants with an incentive
to under-report their age and thereby earn a bonus. We
measured the truth-lie gap by calculating the difference be-
tween participants’ real age and the age threshold for the
bonus. To examine whether emotional intensity can
explain our findings (Puntoni et al. 2009), we also explored
the language effect on emotional responses after lying.
Method
We recruited 1,000 native Chinese speakers from the
registered users of Baidu.com and received 996 responses
in total (452 females, Mage ¼ 28.5, SDage ¼ 6.8). We of-
fered a bonus payment to younger participants and asked
each participant to indicate whether they were qualified for
the bonus by stating their age. To ensure participants un-
derstood the focal measure, we asked participants to trans-
late the monetary incentive from L1 to L2 (“If you are
between 18 and 25 years old, you are qualified for a bonus
of 10RMB”). We decided to use 25 as the age threshold be-
cause study 3 showed that the majority of respondents on
this website were above 25 years old. Most people in the
L1 condition (89%) and the L2 condition (89%) translated
it correctly. We therefore did not exclude any participant
from the analysis.
After the translation task, participants proceeded to a se-
ries of questions, either in L1 or L2. The first question was
about their gender and the second was the focal measure.
Participants had to report their age by choosing “18–25” or
“26 or above.” Unbeknownst to participants, we obtained
their birthdays from Baidu, which allowed us to detect ly-
ing and quantify the truth-lie gap at the individual level.
The study ended with a question probing how people felt at
the moment with a 5-point scale, anchored with five non-
verbal emojis from very negative to very positive (see de
Langhe et al. 2011 for using emoticons to debias the effect
of language on scale usage).
FIGURE 3




























/jcr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcr/ucab001/6117372 by guest on 22 M
arch 2021
Results
Based on their birthdays, participants were divided into
the unincentivized group (N¼ 336, whose ages were be-
tween 18 and 25) and the incentivized group (N¼ 660,
whose ages were above 25). We first checked the age re-
port by the unincentivized group and found that the major-
ity of them (99% in L1 and 98% in L2) selected “18–25.”
This confirmed that participants understood the focal
measure.
Next, we examined the incentivized group. As a measure
of self-diagnosticity, we calculated the gap between their
date of birth and the threshold qualifying participants for
the bonus (25 years ago from the date of their participa-
tion), which ranged from 0.02 to 38.95 in years (median ¼
5.50). We coded the selection of “18–25” as lying and oth-
erwise honest and regressed the decision to lie on the natu-
ral log of age gap (to correct for the positive skew), and
their interaction. The logistic regression revealed a signifi-
cant interaction between language and self-diagnosticity
(b¼ 0.46, SE ¼ 0.20, z¼ 2.26, p ¼ .024, d¼ 0.25). As
shown in figure 4, the likelihood of lying significantly de-
creased with the log age gap in L2 (b ¼ 0.66, SE ¼ 0.13,
z ¼ 5.05, p < .001, d ¼ 0.36) but even more in L1 (b ¼
1.12, SE ¼ 0.15, z ¼ 7.25, p < .001, d ¼ 0.62).
Moreover, L2 significantly increased lying relative to L1
(ps < .05) when the age gap exceeds 1.5 (the shaded area
in figure 4); no significant language effect emerged below
that point. Overall, L2 made people feel more positive
(M¼ 3.74 vs. M¼ 3.40, t(657) ¼ 3.64, p < .001,
d¼ 0.29), and the effect holds for both liars and non-liars
(interaction p ¼ .536). This suggests that L2 did not attenu-
ate emotional experience of lying.
Discussion
Study 5 replicated studies 3 and 4 by assessing the truth-
lie gap at the individual level and measuring real behavior.
We next turn to the case of performance tasks, where lying
not only signals one’s dishonesty but also competence. We
test whether the language effect can reverse when lying is
weakly diagnostic of dishonesty but concurrently diagnos-
tic of competence.
STUDIES 6A, 6B, AND 6C: LYING ABOUT
PERFORMANCE
In the previous studies, we investigated selfish lying as a
function of the diagnosticity of the dishonest self. We docu-
mented two boundary conditions: the language effect was
reduced when additional cues for self-diagnosticity were at-
tached to L2 (study 2) and when self-diagnosticity in L1
was reduced (studies 3–5). In study 6, we examine another
boundary condition, which is predicted to reverse the lan-
guage effect (i.e., less selfish lying in L2). We consider a
performance task, where lying indicates better performance
and thus is diagnostic of competence. Past research shows
that performance goals constitute a reason to condone dis-
honest deeds (Cohn et al. 2014; Pulfrey and Butera 2013).
Accordingly, we predicted that the desire to maintain a com-
petent self could make L2 decrease lying, but only when ly-
ing is weakly diagnostic of the dishonest self.
The Paradigm
We created a spot-the-difference task to introduce a per-
formance goal while incentivizing lying. The task required
participants to find three differences between two advertis-
ing images, ostensibly as a test of visual acuity.
Participants observed a pair of ad images for 5 seconds and
then indicated whether they found three differences be-
tween them, by selecting “yes” (rewarded a bonus) or “no”
(no bonus), with no time limit to answer. Importantly, an-
swering “yes” must be a lie when the two images have less
than three differences (i.e., a cheatable trial). Building on
the notion that motive is manifest in persistent behavior
(Bargh, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen 2010; Toure-Tillery and
Fishbach 2014), we implement multiple cheatable trials
within individuals to identify the dominant self-motive (to be
competent or to be moral) and how this is affected by
FIGURE 4
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for analyses
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language. Multiple trials also give people a chance to balance
competing motives (Saint Clair and Forehand 2020), allow-
ing us to observe trade-offs between motives. Because prior
research shows that too many repetitions can lead to a
“slippery slope” of dishonesty (Garrett et al. 2016), we chose
a moderate number of cheatable trials (9) for this study.
As in preceding studies, the diagnosticity of dishonesty
was manipulated via the truth-lie gap, which increases as
the number of actual differences between the two images
decreases from two to zero. In two-difference trials, we pre-
dict that people would lie more in L1 than in L2 because
these lies are intrinsically rewarding (highly diagnostic of
the competent self) at little cost (weakly diagnostic of the
dishonest self). In zero-difference trials, L2 should increase
lying as the lie is highly diagnostic of the dishonest self.
Table 2 summarizes the cheatable trials. Two pilot studies
(see web appendix C) confirmed that (i) L2 makes lying less
diagnostic of both the dishonest and competent selves and
(ii) the diagnosticity of the dishonest self is highest in zero-
difference trials and lowest in two-difference trials.
Procedure and participants
Studies 6a, 6b, and 6c followed the same procedure.
Participants first completed demographic questions and
rated their ability to read in L2 (adapted from the
Interagency Language Roundtable scale, 2011;
“Elementary: I can read a few words and phrases,”
“Intermediate: I can read simple paragraphs like emails,”
“Upper-intermediate: I can read long essays,” “Advanced:
I can read original works”). We randomly assigned those
above the elementary level to complete the spot-the-
difference task in L1 or L2. It is worth noting that none of
the studies were advertised as L2-related and people who
failed the L2 screening completed the study in L1 and re-
ceived proper payment. By doing so, we gave no incentive
to participants to inflate their L2 proficiency. L2 profi-
ciency does not moderate the language effects on dishon-
esty (ps > .375).
The spot-the-difference task has 12 trials in random
sequences. In addition to the nine cheatable trials, three-
difference trials were added to minimize participants’ suspi-
cion (participants also completed two practice trials with
three differences before the start of the task). A pilot study
with no incentive to lie (N¼ 67 native Chinese speakers
who passed the English proficiency screening) confirms that
people in both L1 and L2 could accurately tell the number
of differences between images (see web appendix D for the
pilot results and the analyses of three-difference trials).
Study 6a (L1 5 Chinese; L2 5 English). We recruited
200 participants from witmart.com, a Chinese crowdsourc-
ing platform similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk, and re-
ceived 234 responses, of which 153 passed the L2
proficiency screening (67 females, Mage ¼ 26.17, SDage ¼
4.48). The bonus for each successful find in the spot-the-
difference task was 0.65 CNY (0.10 USD).
Study 6b (L1 5 French; L2 5 English). We recruited
native French speakers with the help of three assistants
who worked in France and stopped data collection after the
number of responses ceased to increase for a week. We re-
ceived 70 responses, all of which passed the L2 proficiency
screening (30 females, Mage ¼ 31.28, SD ¼ 7.70). The bo-
nus for each successful find was 0.20 euros (0.23 USD).
Study 6c (L1 5 Chinese; L2 5 Korean). We hired a
Chinese survey company (wjx.cn) to reach 250 Korean
learners and received 265 responses. A total of 119 of them
passed the L2 proficiency screening (89 females; Mage ¼
29.82, SD ¼ 4.32). The bonus for each successful find was
1.5 CNY (0.22 USD).
Results
Likelihoods of Lying. Given the nested structure of the
data (multiple observations per truth-lie gap within individ-
uals), we constructed a multilevel model to unbiasedly esti-
mate the joint effect of language and truth-lie gap on the
likelihood of lying (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The out-
come variable is binary with a logit link (successful find/
lying ¼ 1, unsuccessful find/honest ¼ 0). The truth-lie gap
is the trial-level predictor (continuous), and language (L1
vs. L2) is the individual-level predictor (binary). The
model allowed random intercepts nested within the type of
trials within participants. Table 3 summarizes the model
estimates. For conciseness, below we only discuss the sta-
tistical results of the zero- and two-difference trials, as the
results of one-difference trials fell between the two.
In all three studies, we find significant interactions be-
tween the truth-lie gap and language (study 6a: z ¼ 7.19;
6b: z ¼ 3.61; 6c: z ¼ 4.35; ps < .001), where the nega-
tive signs indicate that the tendencies in the L1 condition
were attenuated in the L2 condition. Replicating the results
of previous studies, L2 increased lying in zero-difference
trials (highly diagnostic of the dishonest self) (study 6a:
z¼ 3.39, p < .001, d¼ 0.74; 6b: z¼ 2.33, p ¼ .020,
d¼ 1.06; 6c: z¼ 1.92, p ¼ .055, d¼ 0.52). Crucially, L2
decreased lying in two-difference trials (diagnostic of the
competent self but weakly diagnostic of the dishonest self)
TABLE 2
TRIALS IN THE SPOT-THE-DIFFERENCE TASK AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSE
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in studies 6a (z ¼ 4.26, p < .001, d ¼ 0.97) and 6c (z ¼
1.80, p ¼ .072, d ¼ 0.49), although not significantly in
study 6b (z ¼ 0.96, p ¼ .339, d ¼ 0.40).
Dominant Motives. To better understand the behavioral
pattern, we examined persistent lying versus truth-telling,
as behavioral indicators for the strength of the motive to
maintain a competent versus an honest self (Bargh et al.
2010). As shown in table 4, zero-difference trials encour-
aged persistent truth-telling, suggesting participants’ desire
to main the honest self. In contrast, two-difference trials in-
duced persistent lying, implying the desire for self-
competence. More importantly, in L2, there is less persis-
tent lying in two-difference trials and less persistent truth-
telling in zero-difference trials.2 These support the notion
that L2 weakens the dominant motive.
Discussion
Studies 6a, 6b, and 6c show that L2 can reduce lying
in the case of performance tasks. When the motive to ap-
pear competent competes with the motive to be honest,
the precise effect of language on dishonesty becomes dy-
namic and depends on which motive dominates.
Moreover, the fact that L2 proficiency does not moder-
ate the language effects suggests that fluency of infor-
mation processing (less fluent in L2) cannot explain the
results.
STUDY 7: PROSOCIAL LYING
In the preceding studies, we examined selfish lying
that benefits oneself at the cost of others. In real life,
consumer also lies for others’ benefits at their own
costs, known as “white lies” or prosocial lying (Argo
and Shiv 2012; Erat and Gneezy 2012). Past research
shows that prosocial lying is partially driven by peo-
ple’s compassion toward others (Lupoli et al. 2017), a
key component of moral identity (Aquino and Reed
2002; also see our replication in appendix). If prosocial
lying is diagnostic of a positive, compassionate self, our
theory predicts that L2 would decrease prosocial lying
by reducing self-diagnosticity, hence reversing the ef-
fect documented in studies 1–5 for selfish lying. Again,
we tested whether the language effect is constrained by
self-diagnosticity, such that it becomes weaker when
people see lying as less diagnostic of the compassionate
self.
Method
Participants and Procedure. We recruited 500 native
Chinese speakers from Credamo.com and received 511
complete responses (177 females; Mage ¼ 32.33, SD ¼
10.46). Participants read a scenario about prosocial lying.
Specifically, they imagined that they were visiting a for-
eign friend who showed them around the city and took
them to various restaurants. Today the friend was planning
their dinner and asked them to choose between two cui-
sines, A and B. They like cuisine A and dislike cuisine B,
but the restaurant for cuisine B was much closer (10 minute
walk) than the restaurant for cuisine A (30 minute drive),
saving the friend time and effort. Participants first com-
pleted an understanding check (“which cuisine do you ac-
tually like?”) and then indicated which cuisine they would
tell their friend they like, either in L1 (Chinese) or L2
(English). Telling their friend they like cuisine B is a lie
that helps their friend. As a measurement of self-
diagnosticity, participants then rated in L1 whether the ly-
ing option (tell the friend they like cuisine B) signals that
they are compassionate on a 7-point scale (1¼ absolutely
not, 7¼ absolutely yes). Lastly, participants translated the
lying option from L2 into L1 and completed demographic
questions.
Pretest. We conducted a pretest to verify that (i) peo-
ple prioritize compassion over honesty in the scenario
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED LIKELIHOODS OF LYING ACROSS TRIALS AND LANGUAGES IN STUDIES 6A TO 6C
Study Language Condition 2-Difference trials (%) 1-Difference trials (%) 0-Difference trials (%)
6a L1 82a 57 35a
L2 59a 57 56a
6b L1 47 25 11a
L2 38 35 30a
6c L1 59b 49 41b
L2 48b 53 55b
aSignificant language effect at p < .001.
bLanguage effect at p < .1.
2 Consistent with the primacy of the honest self, results of one-
difference trials resemble the pattern in zero-difference trials, where
L2 primarily decreased persistent truth-telling (6a: 15% vs. 32%, v2(1)
¼ 6.18, p ¼ .013, d ¼ 0.54; 6b: 43% vs. 55%, v2(1) ¼ 0.89, p ¼
.345, d ¼ 0.25; 6c: 13% vs. 33%, v2(1) ¼ 7.15, p ¼ .008, d ¼
0.69), rather than increased persistent lying (6a: 26% vs. 39%, p ¼
.089; 6b: 22% vs. 9%, p ¼ .150; 6c: 36% vs. 32%, p ¼ .647).
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about prosocial lying and (ii) prosocial lying is viewed as
more diagnostic of the compassionate self than the dishon-
est self. A total of 104 native Chinese speakers (49
females, Mage ¼ 27.82, SD ¼ 7.76) read the scenario in
their L1 and indicated which is more important in the sce-
nario, to be compassionate or to be honest, on a 7-point
scale (1¼ absolutely to be honest, 7¼ absolutely to be
compassionate). People believe that being compassionate
is relatively more important (M¼ 5.18, SD ¼ 1.87, signifi-
cantly above the midpoint, t(103) ¼ 6.44, p < .001). In ad-
dition, participants rated whether they saw lying in this
case reflected that they were compassionate and dishonest
(two separate questions), on a 7-point scale (1¼ absolutely
no, 7¼ absolutely yes). Results confirm that in this context
lying is viewed as more reflective of a compassionate self
(M¼ 5.15, SD ¼ 1.64) than a dishonest self (M¼ 4.27, SD
¼ 1.66), paired t(103) ¼ 3.57, p < .001.
Results and Discussion
Validating the procedure and confirming the pretest
results, participants viewed prosocial lying as reflective of
a compassionate self (M¼ 4.40, SD ¼ 1.96, significantly
above the midpoint 4, t(510) ¼ 4.61, p < .001, d¼ 0.20;
recall that the rating was provided in L1 and thus does not
differ by language condition, p ¼ .454, d¼ 0.07).
A logistic regression with lying as dependent variable,
and language, self-diagnosticity, and their interaction as
predictors reveals a significant main effect of language. As
predicted, the main effect of language in this study was the
opposite of the one found in our studies on selfish lying: on
average (at the mean value of self-diagnositicity, 4.40), L2
led to less lying (b ¼ 0.65, SE ¼ 0.19, z ¼ 3.41, p <
.001, d ¼ 0.36). The overall proportion of liars was 42%
in L1 and 28% in L2 (v2(1) ¼ 12.02, p < .001, d ¼
0.39).
Moreover, the interaction between language and self-
diagnosticity was significant (b ¼ 0.22, SE ¼ 0.10, z ¼
2.28, p ¼ .023, d ¼ 0.12). As shown in figure 5, L2 sig-
nificantly decreased lying (ps < .05; the shaded area in fig-
ure 5) only when self-diagnosticity scored above 4 on the
7-point scale. Similar to the preceding studies, this is pri-
marily driven by self-diagnosticity in L1 (slope: b¼ 0.20,
SE ¼ 0.07, z¼ 2.99, p ¼ .003, d¼ 0.11) instead of L2 (b ¼
0.02, SE ¼ 0.07, z ¼ 0.30, p ¼ .767, d ¼ 0.01). This
pattern supports our theory that lying in L2 is less self-
diagnostic than in L1.
This supports our prediction that L2 reduces prosocial
lying only when it is diagnostic of a positive self in L1.
The interaction also shows that lying significantly in-
creased with self-diagnosticity of compassion in the L1
condition, but not in the L2. This pattern validates our the-
orizing that self-image in L1 is detached from lying deci-
sions in L2. We find similar results when excluding
participants who failed the translation task (excluded
n¼ 64; b ¼ 0.23, SE ¼ 0.10, z ¼ 2.24, p ¼ .025, d ¼
0.13) or the attention check (excluded n¼ 68; b ¼
0.21, SE ¼ 0.11, z ¼ 1.91, p ¼.056, d ¼ 0.12).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We proposed a novel self-diagnosticity theory to explain
how language affects lying behavior. The theory is sup-
ported by the finding that L2 increases selfish lying (stud-
ies 1–6) and three boundary conditions: (i) the effect is
reduced when there is a salient cue of diagnosticity of the
dishonest self in L2 (study 2), (ii) the effect weakens when
lying appears less diagnostic of the dishonest self in L1
(studies 3–6), and (iii) the effect reverses when lying is
weakly diagnostic of the dishonest self but highly diagnos-
tic of the competent self (study 6). Study 7 adds further
support to our theory by showing that L2 reduces prosocial
lying that is diagnostic of the compassionate self, and the
TABLE 4
THE DYNAMIC OF THE DOMINANT MOTIVE IN STUDIES 6A TO 6C
2-Difference trials 0-Difference trials
L1 (%) L2 (%) v2 p d L1 (%) L2 (%) v2 p d
Persistent truth-telling
6a 5 14 3.63 .057 0.31 44 16 14.40 <.001 20.78
6b 33 43 0.72 .395 0.19 82 60 4.15 .042 20.62
6c 24 21 0.10 .757 0.06 49 23 8.60 .003 20.64
Persistent lying
6a 67 33 17.91 <.001 20.79 26 32 0.75 .388 0.14
6b 24 19 0.29 .588 0.12 9 16 0.79 .374 0.20
6c 41 16 9.07 .003 20.72 33 23 1.49 .223 0.23
NOTE—. Percentages of individuals who are fully honest or dishonest and the chi-square results of the language effects with two-tailed p-values. Statistics in
bold are significant effects in predicted directions (ps < .05). d is Cohen’s ds that contrast L2 against L1.
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effect weakens as the diagnosticity of compassion
decreases.
Our studies address various consumer and language con-
texts and provide consistent support for our theory with
different manipulations and measurements of self-
diagnosticity (via explicit self-labeling in studies 2 and 7
as well as the truth-lie gap in the other studies).
Importantly, we also exclude several potential alternative
explanations. Study 3 rules out code-switching and culture-
priming. Study 5 rules out emotional reactions to lying.
Study 6 excludes explanations related to language profi-
ciency, like comprehension and fluency. Next, we discuss
theoretical and practical implications and outline avenues
for future research.
Theoretical Implications
Despite the large literatures on lying behavior and on
how language influences decision-making, there is no con-
sensus on how language influences lying behavior. On the
one hand, research on moral intentions and cognitive proc-
essing of lies suggests that lying is easier in L2 (Du~nabeitia
and Costa 2015; Suchotzki and Gamer 2018). This conclu-
sion is consistent with the well-established finding that L2
leads to more utilitarian moral responses, which are usually
perceived as self-threatening (Corey et al. 2017; Hayakawa
et al. 2017). On the other hand, experiments on incentiv-
ized lying show inconsistent results (Alempaki et al. 2020;
Bereby-Meyer et al. 2020). Our research provides clarity
by suggesting that the effect of language of lying depends
on self-diagnosticity. Joining prior research showing that
self-identity can be primed by situational cues such as
one’s signature (Kettle and H€aubl, 2011), we showed that
language is an antecedent of self-diagnosticity and, specifi-
cally, that L2 reduces it. Accordingly, lying can be easier
in L2, if lying is diagnostic of the dishonest self, but it can
also be more difficult in L2, if lying is diagnostic of a de-
sirable aspect of the self.
Our self-diagnosticity theory is related to but distinct
from several existing theories of bilingualism. One promi-
nent theory is that L2 leads to less intense emotional expe-
riences (Pavlenko 2006; Puntoni et al. 2009). Applied to
lying behavior, this means that the precise effect of lan-
guage on lying might depend on whether people anticipate
pain or pleasure from lying and the intensity of their feel-
ings in L1. Although we did not find evidence for a role of
emotionality in study 5, this emotion-blunting account
overlaps with the current self-diagnosticity theory in the
sense that people might anticipate specific emotions (e.g.,
guilt or pride) about enacting a self-diagnostic behavior
and the emotional intensity might decrease as self-
diagnosticity lessens. Thus, both accounts can explain the
heterogeneity of language effects, yet our self-
diagnosticity theory identifies why people might anticipate
positive or negative feelings about lying in the first place.
Another prominent theory is that L2 weakens automatic
processing (Hayakawa et al. 2016) and thus reduces intui-
tive lying or honesty. Similar to our self-diagnosticity the-
ory, this suggests that L2 can either increase or decrease
dishonesty depending on the situation and that the magni-
tude of the language effect would depend on the strength
of intuition. What distinguishes our theory from this ac-
count, however, is that we pin down self-diagnosticity as a
driving force. That is, self-diagnosticity may underlie
moral intuitions, and the informational value of one’s be-
havior for self-image is likely a fundamental difference be-
tween L1 and L2.
More broadly, our research suggests that self-
diagnosticity could drive language effects in various con-
texts. Early research on bilingualism includes case studies
by psychotherapists, who observed that their patients chose
to use L2 to detach themselves from self-threatening expe-
riences (Greenson 1950). Similarly, bilingual authors often
refer to self-distancing as a primary reason to write in L2
(Grimes 2018). These reinforce the notion that L2 reduces
self-diagnosticity in general and suggests the possibility
that the self-diagnosticity theory could be extended to ex-
plain a wide array of language-related phenomena. Prior
research shows that L2 suppresses self-related superstitious
beliefs (Hadjichristidis, Geipel, and Surian 2019), attenu-
ates neural responses to self-relevant feedback (Gao et al.
2015), and reduces the endowment effect (Karataş 2020).
Although these findings have not been interpreted as tied
to self-diagnosticity, they are consistent with our proposi-
tion that people are less likely to draw self-inferences from
their behavior in L2 contexts. Even when people are
FIGURE 5
ESTIMATED LIKELIHOODS OF LYING IN L2 VERSUS L1 ALONG
SELF-DIAGNOSTICITY
NOTE—. The dotted line cuts off at 4, above which L2 decreased lying at p < .05
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evaluating others’ unethical behavior, their leniency in L2
could be attributed to reduced self-awareness in moral sit-
uations (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, Surian 2015). Our theory
highlights self-diagnosticity as a pivotal construct for un-
derstanding the decision-making of bilingual consumers.
Practical Implications
Companies are concerned about consumers’ dishonesty
and invest heavily in identifying and deterring potential
fraud (FRISS 2019; Ma 2018). Our research shows that
companies should not assume that consumers behave simi-
larly in L2 and L1 language contexts: consumers are gener-
ally more likely to lie in L2 contexts. Our studies address
several consumer-relevant situations (e.g., personal details,
insurance claims) and rewards (saving time, earning
money, saving money) and the results might inform many
other contexts. For example, consumers who are filling out
a survey in L1 may choose to tell the truth even if that
means having to answer more follow-up questions,
whereas consumers filling out the same survey in L2 may
lie to save time. Moreover, the theory-derived moderators
explored in our studies provide clues to the practical con-
texts where an effect of language is more versus less likely
to be an issue for companies.
In particular, our dynamic view of the effect of language
suggests that lying will not always be higher in L2. Based
on the findings of studies 6a–6c, for example, we predict
that online gamers who are motivated to outperform others
in the community may not hesitate to lie in L1 when lying
gives them an undeserved advantage but might become
less opportunistic in L2. More generally, our findings sug-
gest that how consumers behave in one language context
may not be predictive of their behavior in the other.
Categorizing users as “high risk” or “low risk” in terms of
dishonesty could be inappropriate when consumers make
decisions across different language contexts and incentives
to lie. Thus, our research suggests that the precise effect of
language on the propensity to lie depends on the situation.
It is when the selfish lie is difficult to justify in L1 that L2
will generally increase lying. An illustrative anecdote is
the report of more foreign than domestic students being
caught cheating (Jordan and Douglas 2016). Similarly, in
the marketplace, we suspect that financial losses some-
times result from the dishonesty of L2 speakers on rela-
tively rare lies, such as faking student accounts to save
money on purchases. Paying attention to the effect of lan-
guage in those cases may prove more fruitful than looking
into the languages used by customers for minor lies that
are very common (and easily justifiable).
To curb selfish lying in L1, previous research has aimed
to enhance peoples’ self-awareness (e.g., using a mirror,
Batson et al., 1999, or mentioning the word “cheater,”
Bryan et al. 2013). In line with this, campaigns against dis-
honesty have been implemented with a focus on self-
awareness (e.g., the monitoring eyes in campaigns against
tax evasions). Another commonly used tactic is to remind
the people of moral norms, by for example, letting them
sign an honor code (Mazar et al. 2008). Our self-
diagnosticity theory, however, suggests that increasing
one’s awareness can produce paradoxical effects on dis-
honesty, given the complexity of the self-concept.
Similarly, merely reiterating moral norms against dishon-
esty might be futile unless people see lying as self-
diagnostic. The implication is that, in the design of market-
ing campaigns, appealing to one’s honest self should be a
more effective strategy in minimizing selfish lying, in both
L1 and L2. Moreover, when lying is prosocial and the goal
is to minimize it, appealing to the moral self in general
might be counter-productive.
Directions for Future Research
The current research tests the theorizing by manipulating
or measuring self-diagnosticity. Building on previous re-
search, we manipulated self-diagnosticity by varying the
truth-lie gap. Past research suggests that self-diagnosticity
can also be manipulated in other ways, for example, using
a mirror (Wicklund 1979), re-framing goal progress
(Toure-Tillery and Fishbach 2015), or making people be-
lieve they will or will not remember what they did (Toure-
TIllery and Kouchaki 2020). Future research can test
whether these manipulations effectively alter self-
diagnosticity and provide more insights into how to mini-
mize lying in L1 as well as in L2.
The effect of language on cognition and behavior is
complex and pervasive. Beyond reducing self-
diagnosticity, language may influence dishonesty in other
ways. Although we exclude several explanations for our
findings, they may operate in other situations. For instance,
the sociolinguistic perspective suggests that language com-
municates a social identity (Luna and Peracchio 2005). It
predicts that when L2 represents a social group that people
do not want to affiliate with, using L2 may lead to self-
affirmation and thus increase people’s adherence to the be-
havior consistent with their self-concept. This is not the
case in our studies, where L2 reduces the resistance to self-
ish lying and the adherence to prosocial lying. However, it
might occur when L2 is uniformly associated with an unde-
sirable social identity (e.g., when L2 reminds people of po-
litical oppression or societal divisions), such that L2
decreases selfish lying and increases prosocial lying.
Future research could test this prediction.
Another way in which language can influence lying is
that the lower proficiency in L2 constitutes an excuse for
lying (e.g., “I don’t understand the question so it doesn’t
count as lying”). This is unlikely the case in our studies
where participants passed understanding checks (studies 2,
3, 5, and 7) or speak L2 very fluently (studies 1 and 4).
Nevertheless, L2 may be an excuse for lying when the
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cheatable question appears difficult to understand, espe-
cially when it includes jargons such as legal terms. In addi-
tion, even when people do not use L2 proficiency to justify
lying to themselves, they may find it an appealing excuse
when retrospectively inquired about why they have lied.
This suggests that liars may be motivated to exhibit lower
L2 proficiency for moral disengagement.
None of our studies imposes punishment for lying and
the incentive for lying was fixed. In real life, however,
there is usually at least some uncertainty in the costs and
benefits of lying and language may influence perceived un-
certainty. For instance, research shows that L2 lowers the
perceived risk and heightens the perceived benefits of so-
cial hazards (Hadjichristidis, Geipel, and Savadori 2015).
In the same vein, language might influence the perceived
risks and benefits of lying. Future research should examine
the role of language when extrinsic costs and benefits of ly-
ing are uncertain. Our speculation is that, if L2 indeed
makes people less vigilant against punishment and more
optimistic about gains, it should increase selfish lying to an
even greater extent compared to what we have observed in
this research.
Most of our studies utilized online panels to reach di-
verse populations of bilinguals. Similar to other data sour-
ces, online panels can suffer from participants’ lack of
attention and poor understanding of study requirements
(Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Thomas and
Clifford 2017). To ensure that our findings are not con-
founded by these factors, we inserted various screenings
and excluded participants who failed them (studies 2, 3, 6a,
and 6c). In study 2, for instance, we only allowed partici-
pants who passed the understanding check to enter the ex-
periment; people who failed the check were blocked from
going further. Similarly, in study 6, we randomly assigned
participants into L1 and L2 conditions only after they
passed the screening of L2 proficiency. Without such
screenings, it would be difficult to tell whether our findings
result from the usage of language or random responding.
On the other hand, these screenings might exclude more
participants from one condition than another, potentially
biasing the results. This is not the case in our studies where
randomization occurs after screenings (studies 2, 6a, and
6c), and where exclusion rates are comparable in L1 and
L2 (study 3). However, to fully eliminate the concern over
the quality of responses and high attrition rates, it will be
necessary for future research to reach highly motivated and
proficient bilinguals in offline settings.
Finally, there are other popular types of dishonesty that
warrant future research. One example is consumers’ reluc-
tance to share personal information for privacy concerns
(John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2011). Language may in-
fluence people’s willingness to share personal information
by altering the perception that disclosing private informa-
tion is self-exposing. Another form of dishonesty that has
received increasing attention is the sharing of fake news.
When are people more likely to share news articles that
they know might contain false information? Social identity
theory suggests that people may be motivated to share fake
news that boost the image of their social group (e.g., fake
news portraying the rival group in a negative light; Tajfel
and Turner 1986). Based on our theory, L2 might reduce
this kind of motivated sharing of fake news. We call for ad-
ditional research to better understand how language con-
tributes to privacy-related behaviors and the spread of
misinformation.
DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION
The data for study 1 were collected at Erasmus
Behavioral Lab, Erasmus University, in the winter of 2020.
The data for the following studies are from online panelists
on various platforms: studies 2 and 7 on credamo.com, in
the spring and summer of 2020; studies 3 and 5 on mtc.bai-
du.com and study 4 on prolific.ac, all in the autumn of
2019; and study 6a on witmart.com in the spring of 2016.
The first author collected all these data and supervised the
data collection for study 6b by three assistants and for
study 6c by a survey company (wjx.cn), both in the sum-
mer of 2016. The first author analyzed the data, which are
archived at https://osf.io/uj3my/.
APPENDIX
Following the procedure by Aquino and Reed (2002, pilot
study 2), we asked 800 native Chinese speakers (415
females, Mage ¼ 30.13, SDage ¼ 11.26) to indicate on a
scale ranging from 1 (absolutely unnecessary) to 5 (abso-
lutely necessary) the extent to which they believed it is
necessary for someone to possess each of the characteris-
tics listed below to be considered a moral person. We find
that participants deemed being honest as highly important
and even more important than the other moral traits
(M¼ 4.63, SD ¼ 0.59 out of 5; scored significantly higher
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